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FORUM

Maryland v. Louisiana Compared with
Commonwealth Edison v. Montana
or

How to Tax Energy Production
During the summer of 1081, the
United States Supreme Court considered two cases involving apparently
similar facts and reached an opposite
result in each. Both cases involved
state taxation of energy obtained from
"federally controlled lands" with the burden of the tax falling on consumers in
other states. In each instance, the tax
was challenged as a violation of the
Supremacy Clause' and of the Commerce Clause.2 In Maryland v. Louisiana,3 the Court struck down Louisiana's First Use Tax 4 because it violated
both clauses. In Commonwealth Edison v.
Montana,5 the Court upheld Montana's Severance Tax. This article is an
attempt to reconcile these apparently
opposing decisions.
In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Court
first considered as a threshold issue,
and rejected, a motion to dismiss
because the case was not an appropriate one for the exercise of original
jurisdiction.
On the merits, the Court found
that the plaintiffs were entitled to
judgment on the pleadings, first of all,
since 1303 C of the Louisiana First
Use Tax was found to be invalid
under the Supremacy Clause, i.e.,
preempted by federal legislation. The
First Use Tax was imposed on the
"first use" of any gas imported into
Louisiana which was not previously
subjected to taxation by another state
or the United States. The tax is precisely equal to the severance tax the
state imposes on Louisiana gas producers. A taxable "use" was defined as
the sale, the transportation in the
state to the point of delivery at the
inlet of any processing plant, or the
transportation in the state of unprocessed natural gas to the point of
delivery.6 The primary effect was on
the owners of gas produced in the
outer continental shelf (land outside
the three-mile off-shore limit) in which

the U.S. possesses a paramount interest. Section 1303 C of the tax prohibited recovery. of the costs associated with the tax from anyone other
than a purchaser of the gas. Since the
Natural Gas Act 7 grants the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
the authority to regulate the wholesale
pricing of natural gas and to allocate
the costs associated with its production, the Court held that the effect of
1303 C was to interfere with the
FERC's authority to regulate the determination of the allocation of costs
associated with the sale of natural gas
to consumers. The Tax was held to be
unconsitutional because it was inconsistent with the federal scheme.
The plaintiffs also pressed, as a
Supremacy Clause issue, the inconsistency of the First Use Tax with the
Outer Shelf Lands Act which declares
that the subsoil and seabed of the
outer Continental Shelf appertain to
the United States and are subject to
its jurisdiction, control and power of
disposition as provided in this subchapter.8 The court acknowledged
that this provision expressly declared
that "[s]tate taxation laws shall not
apply to the outer Continental Shelf."9
The First Use Tax was also held
unconstitutional because it violated
the Commerce Clause which, by negative implication, limits state power
over interstate and foreign commerce.
In Maryland and Montana, the Court
employed the test set forth in Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,10 to determine compliance with the Commerce
Clause. The Brady test states that no
state tax may be sustained unless the
tax: (1) has a substantial nexus with
the State; (2) is fairly apportioned; (3)
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) is fairly related
to the services provided by the State.1
The tax was held to discriminate
against interstate commerce because

by Nicolette Prevost

of exemption provisions within the
act and provisions for tax credits in
other state statutes for intrastate
owners, effectively causing the burden
of the tax to fall on consumers outside the state.
The First Use Tax failed to survive
scrutiny as a compensatory tax, with
discriminatory effects. In Henneford v.
Silas Mason Co., 11 a use tax was held to
complement a sales tax. Here Louisiana's argument that the First Use Tax
complemented its severance tax on
Louisiana producers was rejected. It
was held that the tax was not compensatory since "Louisiana has no
sovereign interest in being compensated for the severance of resources
from the federally-owned OCS (outer
continental shelf) land." 12
In Commonwealth Edison v. Montana,1 3
the state of Montana, under a 1921
act, imposed a severance tax on coal
mined in the state, including that
mined on federal land. A group of
Montana coal producers and their
out-of-state utility customers sought
refunds of taxes paid under a tax
schedule enacted in 1979. 14
The Court held that the tax did not
violate the Commerce Clause. Under
the Brady test, it was conceded that
the tax satisfied the first two prongs
of the test. The fact that the only
nexus of the severance of the coal is
established in Montana satisfies one
prong. "Because no other state can
tax the severance of the coal, there is
no question of apportionment or multiple taxation and the second prong is
satisfied." 15
The tax was found not to be discriminatory even though 90% of the
coal was shipped to other states and
the tax burden was shifted to citizens
of other states. This conclusion was
based on the fact that the tax was
computed at the same rate regardless
of its destination. A higher amount of
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tax was paid because of the greater
amount of gas consumed, rather than
an in-state/ out-of-state discrimination.
Ultimately, the discrimination issue
was based on a claim that the tax was
not "fairly related to the services provided by the state."16 After determining that the tax was not a "user" fee
but a general revenue, the Court
stated "there is no requirement that
the amount of general revenue taxes
collected from a particular activity
must be reasonably related to the
value of the services provided to the
activity."17 Montana's tax on coal survived scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause.
The tax did not violate the Supremacy Clause since it did not substantially frustrate the purposes of the
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.18
The Court found that in §32 of the
act, Congress expressly authorized
the States to impose severance taxes
on federal lessees without imposing
any limits on the amount of such
taxes and that if the tax was "otherwise lawful, the 1920 Act (Mineral
Lands Leasing Act) does not forbid
it." 19
Finally, the Court considered the
assertion that the tax was unconstitutional because it substantially frustrates national energy policies reflected
in several federal statutes encouraging the production and use of coal.
The Court examined the relevant statutes including the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.20 Section 601(a)(2) of that act provides that
severance taxes be "taken into account"
when determining the need of a state
for federal financial assistance because
of the adverse effects of increased
coal or uranium mining. The Court
concluded that there is evidence that
the statute contemplates the continued existence, not the pre-emption
of. state severance taxes on coal and
other minerals.21
In summary, the similarity of the
two cases is only a surface one and
there are distinctions between them
(the Court sought to distinguish
Marylandin Montana.) The presence of
exemptions and credits for Louisiana
producers can be contrasted with
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Montana's tax rate which was consistent for all. Louisiana was taxing
energy obtained from lands outside
its borders while Montana's tax fell
on resources from within its borders.
It appears that severance taxes on
energy can be passed along to consumers even when the energy is obtained
from federal land, as long as there are
no contrary federal statutory provisions and as long as the tax is computed at the same rate regardless of
its ultimate destination.
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